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Abstract
This paper revisits the “race to the bottom” phenomenon in a simple game the-
oretic framework. We consider two countries and one multinational firm, which
requires two inputs that are imperfect substitutes. In the benchmark model the
labour of each country specializes in a distinct input. Seeking to maximize their
labour incomes, countries simultaneously announce wages following which the
firm chooses its labour employment in each country. We show that “race to the
bottom” (countries setting minimum possible wages) is never an equilibrium.
Moreover there are equilibria with “race to the top”, that is, countries set max-
imum possible wages. This result is robust in an extended model where prior to
competing in wages, each country can make input-specific investments to make
its labour available for one or both inputs. Provided the production function of
the firm is not asymmetrically intensive in either one of the two inputs, there are
equilibria of the extended game with specialization (that is, countries invest in
distinct inputs) as well as “race to the top”.
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1 Introduction
The phenomenon of competitive dilution of labour standards—“race to the bottom”—
by the governments of developing countries1 for attracting multinational corporate eco-
nomic activities to one’s country, especially for direct investment, is a crucial current
issue in the political economy of such countries. In this paper we revisit the phe-
nomenon of “race to the bottom” in a simple game theoretic framework. We explore
whether drastic strategic undercutting of labour’s bargaining power as reflected in the
expected wage labourers can get, is an inevitable outcome of strategic competition be-
tween policy-makers of different countries. Toward this end, first we model the strategic
behaviour of two countries as a two-player game with simultaneous moves where the
action of each country is to choose a wage for its labourers (or a labour policy that
might generate such a price as the expected wage). The payoffs to the players are de-
termined by the production decision of a multinational monopsonist availing the labour
inputs provided by these countries which may be substitutes but not perfect substi-
tutes. Using the properties of supermodular games (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990),
we show that this game has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Exploring
the properties of this equilibrium, we find that “race to the bottom” (countries setting
minimum possible wages) never emerges as an equilibrium outcome while the complete
opposite—“race to the top” (countries setting maximum possible wages)—is possible
for a range of relevant parameters of our model.
We extend this benchmark model to incorporate the feature that at the very first
stage, both countries have to decide simultaneously whether to make an input-specific
fixed investment with the assumption that if such an investment is undertaken for a
specific input, only then the country gets that input available for selling to the monop-
sonist. We show that provided the production function of the firm is not asymmetrically
intensive in either one of the two inputs, in this augmented multi-stage game there are
subgame perfect equilibria at which there is specialization as well as “race to the top”,
that is, each country specializes in getting an input different from the other and then
sets the maximum possible wage for that labour-input.
While anecdotal descriptions of “race to the bottom” in labour standards or wages
are quite common (see, e.g., EPW, 2014), concrete identification of the phenomenon
often proved elusive (see Singh and Zammit, 2004; Potrafke, 2013). Recently Davies
and Vadlamannati (2013) and Olney (2013) have provided empirical evidence in favour
of such phenomena. There has been consideration of whether the phenomenon of “race
to the bottom” is inevitable and some channels through which this can be endogenously
counteracted have been identified. Of course, generating externality of increased de-
mand through increased wages is one well-known channel. This prevalent theme of
development economics has been studied again by Cueto (2017) with regard to labour
standards. In the context of tax competition, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) analyze
how agglomeration effect can counteract “race to the bottom”. McCann et al. (2011)
see how pressure of getting re-elected in a democracy may induce a government to
adopt ways to woo foreign investments other than lowering labour standards. Our re-
1In a recent paper, Cueto (2017) provides a convenient list of the dimensions along which such
dilution has been noted.
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search is along this line: that of identifying factors which can endogenously counteract
this phenomenon.
Our work is motivated by the following simple observations. Race to the bottom in
labour markets is akin to Bertrand competition: competitive undercutting of prices to
increase demand for one’s product. However, the possibility of relaxing such competi-
tion in presence of product differentiation is well-known (from onwards at least Shaked
and Sutton, 1982). A multinational firm (MNC) often organizes production in more
than one country for intermediate products to create its final product which is sold all
over the world. This implies that for such an MNC, productive inputs obtainable in
different countries may not be perfect substitutes although near-perfect substitution is
still possible. As an example one might think of a car manufacturer obtaining mineral
ore or processed metal from one country and having the assembly line in another coun-
try; in the first country it may obtain labour experienced in mining activities and in
the second the labour skilled in works related to a modern automobile industry. We ex-
plore the implication of such production processes involving imperfectly substitutable
labour inputs.
To model the imperfect substitutability of the inputs in the MNC’s production
process, we adopt one usual approach of taking its production function to be of the
CES type. Then we analyze the policy-setting game played by the two countries (as
outlined above and described in detail in the next section). We look at the properties of
pure strategy Nash equilibria as parameters in this benchmark model—especially the
elasticity of substitution—change. However, our focus is on ascertaining whether “race
to the bottom” is feasible (and we find the answer to be negative) and on identifying
situations for which the completely opposite phenomenon, “race to the top”, rather, is
possible. Next we study the extended model focussing on the possibility of “race to the
top” when countries first decide about making specific labour-inputs being available in
the country.
There have been discussions on the channels through which foreign direct invest-
ment may better rights of the labourers in LDCs (see Mosley and Uno, 2007, especially
pp.925-926 for a review they made on this issue). However, the channels identified were
rather non-central and exogenous to the central choice problems of the firms and the
governments. In contrast, the channel through which “race to the top” emerges in our
model is through the core strategic choices in presence of imperfect substitutability of
the factors of production. Moreover, while analyses of MNC’s decisions of input choices
are profuse (see the survey by Antras and Yeaple, 2014; also see Sly and Soderbery,
2014, whose work is close to the theme of this paper), our finding of the possibility of
“race to the top” even when inputs are substitutes seems novel.
The main ingredients of our setup and the benchmark model is described and
analyzed in the following section. Section 3 gives the analysis of the extended model.
Section 4 provides some concluding remarks. Most proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The benchmark model
There are two countries a, b. There is a multinational firm that requires two different
labour inputs 1, 2 to carry out production of a final commodity which we take as
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the numeraire. The two inputs are imperfect substitutes. Let x1, x2 be the amount of
inputs 1, 2. The firm has a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function
(Arrow et al., 1961) given by
F (x1, x2) =
[
αx−ρ1 + (1− α)x−ρ2
]−1/ρ
(1)
where 0 < α < 1 and ρ ∈ (−1, 0) ∪ (0,∞), i.e., ρ > −1 and ρ 6= 0. As we assume that
the product is the numeraire which is sold in the rest of the world, the function F is
called the firm’s profit function.2
Let w1, w2 represent the wages for inputs 1, 2 which the firm has to pay. For any
input i, the firm can purchase any quantity of that input from either of the countries,
at the wages available in that country if the input is indeed available in the country.
However, for both the inputs, the firm has an outside option for getting the input. For
any input, the outside option has a unit wage w.
Assume that the firm has a fixed amount of capital K > 0 that it uses to pay for
the inputs. The budget constraint of the firm is given by
w1x1 + w2x2 = K (2)
For any w1, w2 > 0, the firm’s constrained profit maximization problem (to maximize
(1) subject to (2)) has a unique solution (x∗1(w1, w2), x
∗
2(w1, w2)) . Let pi(w1, w2, K) =
F (x∗1, x
∗
2) be the maximized value of the profit of the firm.
The total labour population in country j ∈ {a, b} is denoted by xj. It is assumed
that xa, xb are sufficiently large so that for the firm’s problem, the labour constraint
is never binding. If the labour of a country is available as an input for the firm, then
the government or the decision-maker of that country sets a fixed wage for that input.
At that wage, the firm may employ any labour for that input. Any labour that is not
employed by the firm gets the reservation wage prevailing in that country.
Notice that it is not necessary that the government in each country has to actually
administer a fixed wage. Think of a more realistic scenario that the labourers in each
country and the management of the firm get into a bilateral conflict over the wages to
be paid and where the probability of a party’s winning depends on the labour policy
adopted by the government. Then the wage set up by the government can be thought
of as the expected price to be paid to the labourers of that country in the face of this
possible conflict. However, in what follows, we shall adopt the simple convention as if
the government in each country administers its wage for each labour input available in
the country and offers the wages to the firm.
2.1 The benchmark model: further ingredients
In the benchmark model we consider the case where each country specializes in one
(and only one) of the inputs. Specifically we assume country a specializes in input 1
and country b in input 2. Therefore, for the remainder of this section, we simply denote
xa = x1 and xb = x2. Likewise, the wages for the inputs are denoted simply by wa, wb.
2Strictly speaking, the function F is the revenue of the firm, but revenue and profit are operationally
equivalent in our model. Calling F the profit function enables us to better interpret our results.
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The strategic interaction is modeled as a simultaneous-move game G where two
countries simultaneously set wages (or, as we remarked above, equivalently, set policies
resulting in effective wages) wa, wb. Note that if wi exceeds w (wage at firm’s outside
option), the firm will not employ any labour from country i. So there is no loss of gen-
erality in restricting wa, wb ≤ w. Given any such wage pair (wa, wb), the firm employs
x∗i (wa, wb) units of labour from
3 country i. Let ψMi (wa, wb, K) = wix
∗
i be the labour
income accruing from the firm in country i. Any labour unit that is not employed
by the firm earns the reservation wage wi of country i (for example, by working in a
traditional sector). So the income for the labour that is not employed by the firm is
ψTi (wa, wb, K) = w
i(xi − x∗i ). Consequently the total labour income in country i is
ψi(wa, wb, K) = ψ
M
i (wa, wb, K) + ψ
T
i (wa, wb, K) = wix
∗
i − wix∗i + wixi (3)
For any (wa, wb), the payoff of the decision-maker in each country is its total labour
income given by (3). We assume 0 < wi < w for i ∈ {a, b}. So there is no loss
of generality in taking wi ∈ [wi, w]. We look for Nash Equilibria in pure strategies
(abbreviated simply as NE) for the game G.
Remark 1: Generally, the payoff of the decision-maker in each country can be a weighted
sum of the firm’s profit and its total labour income as follows
Πa(wa, wb) = λapi(wa, wb, K) + (1− λa)ψa(wa, wb, K)
Πb(wa, wb) = λbpi(wa, wb, K) + (1− λb)ψb(wa, wb, K) (4)
where λa, λb ∈ [0, 1] and λa +λb < 1. The interpretation of this general payoff function
would be that a country’s decision-maker, a priori, may have two kinds of incentives.
It can get a share of the firm’s profit which may be thought of a pecuniary gain of it or
bribe paid to it by the firm. However, the decision-maker may also have some incentive
for increasing the labourers’ income (perhaps so that it does not get too unpopular).
For our analysis we take λa = λb = 0. Later, at the end of this section we make a
remark on the implication of having λi 6= 0 (see Remark 4).
Remark 2: We outline a few notable features of this setup. First, we focus on the labour
policy and extract away from the other general equilibrium features of international
trade: e.g., in our model the firm presumably sells its output in a third country. Next,
we endow the firm with maximum market power. Also, we allow substitutability of
inputs for the firm apart from the single-point of perfect substitutability. And finally,
with λi = 0, our model is equivalent to a variant of Bertrand duopoly with differenti-
ated products.
Lemma 1 The following hold for i, j ∈ {a, b} and i 6= j.
(i) x∗i is decreasing in wi.
(ii) x∗i is increasing in wj if ρ ∈ (−1, 0) and decreasing in wj if ρ ∈ (0,∞).
3We make the tie-breaking assumption that if a country sets a wage exactly equal to w, the firm
employs labour from that country rather than using its outside option.
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(iii) pi is decreasing in wi.
(iv) ψMi is decreasing in wi if ρ ∈ (−1, 0) and increasing in wi if ρ ∈ (0,∞).
Proof See the Appendix.
We explore the properties of NE of G. In particular, we are interested in whether
the equilibria show strategic undercutting or otherwise. Therefore, we introduce the
following definitions.
Definitions A NE of G has
(i) race to the bottom property if wi = w
i for some i ∈ {a, b};
(ii) complete race to the bottom property if wi = w
i for both i ∈ {a, b};
(iii) race to the top property if wi = w for some i ∈ {a, b};
(iv) complete race to the top property if wi = w for both i ∈ {a, b}.
2.2 The equilibria in the benchmark model
Proposition 1 below characterizes best responses of the players in G and shows that G
has a unique NE. It also identifies some initial properties of the NE.
Proposition 1
(I) The best responses of countries in the game G have the following properties.
(i) If ρ ∈ (−1, 0), then for any wj ∈ [wj, w], country i has a unique best
response Bi(wj). The best response function Bi is non-decreasing in wj
and Bi(wj) > w
i for any wj ∈ [wj, w].
(ii) If ρ ∈ (0,∞), then for any wj ∈ [w,w], country i has a unique best response
w.
(II) The game G has a unique NE. The NE has the following properties.
(i) If ρ ∈ (−1, 0), then at the NE, wi > wi for i ∈ {a, b}, i.e., the NE does not
have the race to the bottom property.
(ii) If ρ ∈ (0,∞), then the NE has the complete race to the top property.
(III) The NE value of wi is increasing in wi for i ∈ {a, b}.
Proof See the Appendix.
Since the case where ρ ∈ (0,∞) is immediately clear, next we get on to the case
where ρ ∈ (−1, 0) and identify the property of the equilibrium as the parameters
affecting demands vary.
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Proposition 2 Consider the game G. Let ρ ∈ (−1, 0) and δ ≡ −ρ ∈ (0, 1). Let τa ≡ α,
τb ≡ 1− α and for i, j ∈ {a, b}, i 6= j, define
δ˜i ≡ δ/[1 + (1− δ)(τi/τj)1/(1−δ)] ∈ (0, δ) (5)
(i) (not race to the top) If wi < δ˜iw for i ∈ {a, b}, then at the NE, wi < w for
both i.
(ii) (partial race to the top) If wi < δ˜iw and w
j ≥ δw for i, j ∈ {a, b}, i 6= j, then
at the NE, wi < w and wj = w.
(iii) (complete race to the top) If wi ≥ δ˜iw for both i ∈ {a, b}, then the NE has
complete race to the top property.
(iv) If δ˜iw ≤ wi < δw and wj < δ˜jw then the NE has either has “not race to the top”
or shows partial race to the top.
Proof See the Appendix.
Notice that the most interesting aspect of our results so far is the possibility of
having an equilibrium with “race to the top”—opposite to “race to the bottom”—even
when ρ ∈ (−1, 0), that is, even when the labour inputs can be said to be substitutes
in production. In the case where the two countries are symmetric with respect to
reservation wages, we explore whether we can provide a bound on ρ for which the
equilibrium possesses this property. Let wa = wb = w and denote w/w ≡ θ. Also
denote m ≡ min{α/(1− α), (1− α)/α}. Since 0 < m ≤ 1 and θ > 1, we have
0 < 2/(1 + θ) ≤ (m+ 1)/(mθ + 1) < 1
Proposition 3 Suppose wa = wb = w. If δ ∈ (0, (m + 1)/(mθ + 1)], then the unique
NE of G has race to the top property. Moreover if δ ∈ (0, 2/(1 + θ)], then the unique
NE of G has complete race to the top property.
Proof See the Appendix.
To summarize, the unique equilibrium of G does not have “race to the bottom”
property. When inputs are complementary in production, the equilibrium has “com-
plete race to the top” property. However, even when the labour inputs can be said to
be substitutes in production (but when they are not perfect substitutes) it is possi-
ble to have equilibria showing “race to the top”, the opposite feature of “race to the
bottom”. We provide characterization of such equilibria in terms of the parameters
affecting demand.
Given the nature of the conditions in Proposition 2, the central proposition charac-
terizing the equilibrium in this section, the economics behind the proposition seems as
follows. At an equilibrium (w,w) if a country reduces wage, then indeed the demand
for its labour goes up. However, if the substitution of labour in its favour, driven by
the parameters controlling the firm’s demand for labour is low enough in magnitude,
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then the total labour income resulting from such a unilateral lowering of wage, may,
however, go down owing to the lowering of the wage. Moreover, as the reservation
wage in the country goes up, the volume of incremental labour income of the labour
units shifting from the reservation sector to the monopsonist would also be low enough.
Therefore, as wi increases or as the degree of plausible substitution of labour goes down,
the propensity of “race to the top” being an equilibrium phenomenon goes up.
Remark 3: Note that our model is equivalent to a variant of Bertrand duopoly with
differentiated products. Therefore, this exercise can also be seen as a contribution to
the literature on oligopoly pricing without invoking any connection to the economics
of developing countries. Analyses of price-setting duopoly with differentiated prod-
ucts (with consumer utility function being of linear-quadratic form) are available (see,
e.g., Zanchettin, 2006). However, we consider our framing of the model to be helpful
in throwing light in analyzing inter-country competition for getting multinational in-
vestments. Moreover, the feature of “race to the top” in equilibrium choice seems novel.
Remark 4: Our specification of payoff for the countries—consisting of labour income
only—is crucial for our result. By Lemma 1, pi is decreasing in wi. It follows from
(4) that in the general case if λi (the weight put by the decision-maker of country i
to the profit of the firm) can be made large enough, then it would be optimal for the
decision-maker of country i to push the effective wages down and thus, “race to the
bottom” may re-appear as an equilibrium outcome. Looking at the case λi = 0 enables
us to concentrate on the issue of endogenous counteracting of “race to the bottom”
and to explore the rather counter-intuitive possibility of the “race to the top”.
3 An extension: endogenous specialization
The benchmark model assumed that each of the two countries is endowed with one
distinct country-specific labour input. In this section we drop this assumption and
extend the model by making the choices of specialization endogenous. In the extended
model, to make a specific labour input available in a country the government of that
country has to carry out an initial input-specific investment. This investment can be
conceptualized as a training program which enriches the input-specific human capital
of the labour-force or it can correspond to the fixed cost associated with building an
infrastructure. Specifically, we assume that a country has to make investment c > 0
for every input, so that it has to invest 2c if it wishes that both kinds of labour-inputs
are available within the country.
Note that thematically the analysis following our assumption of input-specific in-
vestment is quite close to analyzing price competition in a differentiated duopoly fol-
lowing a quantity precommitment. There is a literature that has looked at this problem
with quadratic utility functions (e.g., Yin and Ng, 1997; 2000). However, our focus
is a little different. First, we do not concentrate on the precise quantity of capacity
creation: we assume that once the specific investment for an input is made in a country,
any labour unit of that country can be used for that input. Further, our goal is to ver-
ify whether the equilibrium behaviours of wage-setting as observed in the benchmark
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model—especially the “race to the top” behaviour—continue even when the countries
choose on the decision to generate the inputs at a prior stage.
The strategic interaction in this extended framework is modeled as the extensive-
form game Γ. In stage 1 of Γ, the two countries simultaneously decide to make one of
the following investment choices: (i) invest only for input 1 by incurring cost c (choice
1), (ii) invest only for input 2 by incurring cost c (choice 2), (iii) make investment
for both inputs by incurring cost 2c (choice 12) and (iv) invest for none of the inputs
(choice 0). The investment choices become commonly known at the end of stage 1. In
stage 2, countries simultaneously announce wages for inputs in which they have made
investment. For j ∈ {a, b} and i ∈ {1, 2}, if country j has invested in only input i,
it announces wji > 0 (wage of input i); if it has invested in both inputs, it announces
wage pair (wj1, w
j
2) such that w
j
i > 0 for both i ∈ {1, 2}; if it has not invested at all,
there is no wage announcement. In stage 3, the firm chooses how much of each input
to buy and use from each country. We continue to assume that the government of each
country seeks to maximize its total labour income. We restrict to pure strategies to
determine subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) of Γ.
Recall that there is an external source—the outside option of the firm—at which
the firm can obtain any input at wage w. So the firm will not purchase an input in
a country that sets a wage higher than w for that input. Since the profit of the firm
is decreasing in the wage of any input, for each input it is optimal for the firm to
employ labour from a location that offers the lowest wage. We retain the tie-breaking
assumption that if the lowest wage for an input offered by the countries is w, then the
firm does not use the external source. Furthermore, for ease of presentation we carry
out the analysis of the extended game Γ under the assumption that the countries are
symmetric with respect to reservation wages, that is, wa = wb = w.
For ta, tb ∈ {1, 2, 12, 0}, let Γ(ta, tb) be the subgame of Γ that follows the investment
choice tj by country j. Observe that the cost of investment of any country is incurred
prior to this subgame. So this cost can be ignored to determine NE outcomes of the
subgames Γ(ta, tb). If for i = 1, 2, the firm employs x
j
i units of input i at wage wi from
country j, then given the assumption wa = wb = w, the total labour income of country
j is
w1x
j
1 + w2x
j
2 + w(x
j − xj1 − xj2) = (w1 − w)xj1 + (w2 − w)xj2 + wxj (6)
Note if xj1 > 0 and x
j
2 = 0, then the labour income in (6) is (w1 −w)xj1 +wxj whereas
if xj1 = 0 and x
j
2 > 0, it is (w2 − w)xj2 + wxj. If xj1 = xj2 = 0, the labour income is
wxj. Noting that the constant term wxj is common in the labour income of country
j for any wi, x
j
i , we can consider the payoff of country j in Γ(ta, tb) to be simply the
“incremental labour income” above the reservation labour income wxj.
Denote by φji (w1, w2) the incremental labour income of country j when (i) the only
labour input that the firm employs from country j is input i and (ii) the firm employs
x∗i (w1, w2) units of input i (its optimal amount of input i at (w1, w2)) at wage wi from
country j, that is,
φji (w1, w2) := (wi − w)x∗i (w1, w2) (7)
Denote by φj12(w1, w2) the incremental labour income of country j when for both i =
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1, 2, the firm employs x∗i (w1, w2) units of input i at wage wi from country j. That is,
φj12(w1, w2) := (w1 − w)x∗1(w1, w2) + (w2 − w)x∗2(w1, w2) = φj1(w1, w2) + φj2(w1, w2)
Since w1x
∗
1(w1, w2) + w2x
∗
2(w1, w2) = K, we have
φj12(w1, w2) = K − w(x∗1(w1, w2) + x∗2(w1, w2)) (8)
Note from (7) and (8) that φai (w1, w2) = φ
b
i(w1, w2) and φ
a
12(w1, w2) = φ
b
12(w1, w2).
Henceforth we denote the expressions in (7) and (8) simply by φi(w1, w2) and φ12(w1, w2)
dropping the superscript j. Also observe that
φ12(w1, w2) = φ1(w1, w2) + φ2(w1, w2) (9)
Lemma 2 (i) If w1 ≤ w2, then φ12(w1, w2) is increasing in w1 and if w2 ≤ w1, then
φ12(w1, w2) is increasing in w2.
(ii) For w1, w2 ∈ (0, w], the unique maximum of φ12(w1, w2) is attained at w1 = w2 = w.
Proof See the Appendix.
3.1 SPNE of Γ
Recall that for ρ ∈ (−1, 0), we denote δ ≡ 1− ρ so that δ ∈ (0, 1). Also recall that for
the case wa = wb = w, we denote θ ≡ w/w. We have shown in Proposition 3 that if
δ ≤ 1/(1+θ), then the unique NE of the game G has complete race to the top property.
The next proposition shows this result is robust under endogenous choices of spe-
cialization when the production function of the firm is not asymmetrically intensive in
either one of the two inputs. Specifically, when α (the distribution parameter of the
CES function (1)) is close to 1/2, there is always an interval of magnitudes of c for
which the extended game Γ has an SPNE that has specialization as well as complete
race to the top.
Proposition 4 Suppose wa = wb = w and let δ ≤ 2/(1 + θ). Then ∃ ε ∈ (0, 1/2) such
that for any α ∈ (1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε):
∃ 0 ≤ c(α) < c(α) such that if c ∈ (c(α), c(α)), then Γ has an SPNE that has
specialization in inputs as well as complete race to the top. Specifically, for i, j ∈ {1, 2}
and i 6= j, the following outcome is an SPNE: country a invests only in input i, country
b invests only in input j and the wage set for each input is w. Furthermore there is no
other SPNE where at least one of the countries invests in only one input.
Proof To determine SPNE of Γ we note that for any ta, tb ∈ {0, 1, 2, 12}, either (a) the
subgame Γ(ta, tb) has multiple NE, all of which give the same input wages and payoffs,
or (b) it has a unique NE (see Observations 1-6, Section 5.2, Appendix). Using these
results, the interaction between countries a, b in stage 1 of Γ can be presented as the
following “reduced form” game of investment choices in Table 1 where the payoff of a
country in the cell (ta, tb) is its NE payoff at Γ(ta, tb) net of its cost of investment. For
i ∈ {1, 2}, w˜i(α) ∈ (w,w] is a function of α. We write a payoff φi(. , .|α) to indicate
that φi is a function of α. Note that φ12(w,w) is independent of α.
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Table 1: The reduced form game Γ∗α of investment choices
0 1 2 12
0 0, 0 0, 0, 0,
φ1(w,w|α)− c φ2(w,w|α)− c φ12(w,w)− 2c
1 φ1(w,w|α)− c, −c,−c φ1(w,w|α)− c, −c,
0 φ2(w,w|α)− c φ2(w, w˜2(α)|α)− 2c
2 φ2(w,w|α)− c, φ2(w,w|α)− c, −c,−c −c,
0 φ1(w,w|α)− c φ1(w˜1(α), w|α)− 2c
12 φ12(w,w)− 2c, φ2(w, w˜2(α)|α)− 2c, φ1(w˜1(α), w|α)− 2c, −2c,−2c
0 0 0
Observe that for any α ∈ (0, 1), a pair of investment choices (ta, tb) constitutes an
SPNE of Γ if and only if (ta, tb) is an NE of the reduced form game Γ
∗
α.
By (8), φ12(w1, w2|α) = φ1(w1, w2|α) + φ2(w1, w2|α). Since φ1(w,w2|α) = 0 and
φ2(w1, w|α) = 0, we have φ2(w,w2|α) = φ12(w,w2|α) and φ1(w1, w|α) = φ12(w1, w|α).
Then by Lemma 2 it follows that
φ1(w1, w|α) < φ12(w,w) and φ2(w,w2|α) < φ12(w,w) (10)
Consider α = 0.5. Note that φ1(w,w|0.5) = φ2(w,w|0.5) = (1/2)φ12(w,w). By (10),
we have φ1(w1, w|0.5) < 2φ1(w,w|0.5) and φ2(w,w2|0.5) < 2φ2(w,w|0.5). Hence
φ1(w1, w|0.5)− φ1(w,w|0.5) < φ1(w,w|0.5) = φ2(w,w|0.5) and
φ2(w,w2|0.5)− φ2(w,w|0.5) < φ2(w,w|0.5) = φ1(w,w|0.5).
Taking wi = w˜i(0.5), these inequalities imply
φ1(w˜1(0.5), w|0.5)− φ1(w,w|0.5) < φi(w,w|0.5) and
φ2(w, w˜2(0.5)|0.5)− φ2(w,w|0.5) < φi(w,w|0.5) for i = 1, 2 (11)
Since the functions φ1, φ2 are continuous in α, from (11) we conclude that ∃ ε ∈ (0, 0.5)
such that for all α ∈ [0.5− ε, 0.5 + ε]:
φ1(w˜1(α), w|α)− φ1(w,w|α) < φi(w,w|α) and
φ2(w, w˜2(α)|α)− φ2(w,w|α) < φi(w,w|α) for i = 1, 2 (12)
For α ∈ [0.5− ε, 0.5 + ε], denote c(α) := min{φ1(w,w|α), φ2(w,w|α)} and
c(α) := max{φ1(w˜1(α), w|α)− φ1(w,w|α), φ2(w, w˜2(α)|α)− φ2(w,w|α), 0}.
Then by (12), 0 ≤ c(α) < c(α).
Let c ∈ (c(α), c(α)). In what follows we show that in this case both (1, 2) and (2, 1)
are NE of the game Γ∗α. Since c > c(α), we have φ1(w,w|α)− c > φ1(w˜1(α), w|α)− 2c
and since c < c(α), we have φ1(w,w|α)−c > 0 > −c. Then by Table 1, for i, j ∈ {a, b},
investment choice 1 is the unique best response of country j to country i’s investment
choice 2.
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Similarly, since c > c(α), we have φ2(w,w|α) − c > φ2(w, w˜2(α)|α) − 2c and since
c < c(α), we have φ2(w,w|α) − c > 0 > −c, which shows for i, j ∈ {a, b}, investment
choice 2 is the unique best response of country j to country i’s investment choice 1.
This shows that both (1, 2) and (2, 1) are NE of Γ∗α.
Noting that for any country, 2 is the unique best response when the other country
chooses 1 and 1 is the unique best response when the other country chooses 2, we
conclude that (1, 2) and (2, 1) are the only SPNE where at least one country invests in
only one input.
4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we considered a simple game theoretic framework with two countries and
one multinational corporation (MNC) to show that drastic strategic undercutting of
labour’s bargaining power is not an inevitable outcome of strategic competition between
policy-makers of different countries. Notice that our setup is not meant to provide a
comprehensive model of MNCs’ competition and input choice decisions involving all
its multifarious complexities. We focussed on one aspect of an MNC’s organization of
production and looked into the possibility of this feature generating a counteracting
effect to the “race to the bottom”. We find that indeed this feature of imperfect
substitutability of productive inputs can act as a possible counteracting factor to the
“race to the bottom”.
Our analysis suggests that facing the problem of attracting multinational invest-
ment and consequent possible necessity of undercutting labour standards, a way-out
for the developing countries could be to specialize on different types of labour-skills.
We provide some modellings to illustrate this possibility analytically. In fact, in our
setup we have rather deliberately left out some additional factors such as any demand
externality for producers from increased wage of labourers or any agglomeration effects,
which can act as additional countervailing factors to “race to the bottom”.
As we noted in Remark 4 earlier, our specification of payoffs in which the decision
maker of each country maximizes its labour income, is crucial for our result. What
emerges for the labourers in richer environments (e.g., when the payoff of decision-
maker in a country is a weighted sum of labour income and the firms’s profit) is a
matter for future research.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs of results
Proof of Lemma 1 (i)-(ii) Solving the firm’s problem, optimal labour inputs for the
firm are given by
x∗a =
K
wa + [(1− α)wa/αwb]1/(1+ρ)wb , x
∗
b =
K
wb + [αwb/(1− α)wa]1/(1+ρ)wa (13)
Using the expressions above, standard reasoning proves (i)-(ii).
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(iii) Recall that pi(wa, wb, K) is the maximized value of the profit of the firm, i.e.,
pi(wa, wb, K) = F (x
∗
a, x
∗
b). Invoking Roy’s identity (see, e.g., Kreps, 1990, p.57) we have
∂pi(wa, wb, K)/∂wi = −x∗i [∂pi(wa, wb, K)/∂K] for i ∈ {a, b} (14)
By (13), both x∗a, x
∗
b are increasing inK. Since F is increasing in both xa, xb, we conclude
that pi(wa, wb, K) is increasing in K. As x
∗
i > 0, from (14) it follows that pi(wa, wb, K)
is decreasing in wi for i ∈ {a, b}.
(iii) The labour income in the monopoly sector for countries a, b, are given by
ψMa (wa, wb, K) = wax
∗
a =
K
1 + [(1− α)/α]1/(1+ρ)(wb/wa)ρ/(1+ρ)
ψMb (wa, wb, K) = wbx
∗
b =
K
1 + [α/(1− α)]1/(1+ρ)(wa/wb)ρ/(1+ρ) (15)
If ρ ∈ (−1, 0), we have ρ/(1 + ρ) < 0 and hence wρ/(1+ρ)a is decreasing in wa. Conse-
quently the denominator of ψMa is increasing in wa and hence ψ
M
a is decreasing in wa
for any wb ≥ 0. By the same reasoning, ψMb is decreasing in wb for any wa ≥ 0.
If ρ ∈ (0,∞), we have ρ/(1 + ρ) > 0 and hence wρ/(1+ρ)a is increasing in wa. Conse-
quently the denominator of ψMa is decreasing in wa and hence ψ
M
a is increasing in wa
for any wb ≥ 0. By the same reasoning, ψMb is increasing in wb for any wa ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 1 Throughout let i, j ∈ {a, b} and i 6= j. First we prove parts
(I)(ii) and (II)(ii), then parts (I)(i) and (II)(i).
(I)(ii), (II)(ii): Let ρ ∈ (0,∞). Then ψMi is increasing in wi (Lemma 1(iv)). As x∗i is
decreasing in wi (Lemma 1(i)), so is ψ
T
i . Then from (3), it follows that ψi is increasing
in wi for any wj, so the unique best response of country i to any wj is to choose wi = w
which proves (I)(ii). It is immediate from (I)(i) that G has a unique NE (w,w), proving
(II)(ii).
(I)(i), (II)(i): Let ρ ∈ (−1, 0) and δ ≡ −ρ ∈ (0, 1). Denote τa ≡ α and τb ≡ 1− α.
For this case ψMi is decreasing in wi (Lemma 1(iii)(a)). As x
∗
i is decreasing in wi
(Lemma 1(i)), so is ψTi . Define
gi(wi) := τ
1/(1−δ)
j (δwi − wi)wδ/(1−δ)i and hi(wj) := (1− δ)τ 1/(1−δ)i wiwδ/(1−δ)j (16)
Observe that gi(wi) is increasing in wi, hi(wj) is increasing in wj and limwi→∞ gi(wi) =
limwj→∞ hi(wj) =∞. Note from (3) that ∂ψi/∂wi T 0⇔ gi(wi) S hi(wj).
To prove (I)(i), we consider the following two cases.
Case 1 If wi ≥ δw, then for any wj, we have gi(wi) ≤ 0 < hi(wj) and hence
∂ψi/∂wi > 0 for all wi ∈ [wi, w]. So the unique best response of country i to any wj is
to choose wi = w.
Case 2 If wi < δw, then for wi ∈ [wi, wi/δ], we have gi(wi) ≤ 0 < hi(wj) and
hence ψi is increasing in wi in this interval. So for any wj, best response of country i
is to choose wi ∈ [wi/δ, w]. As gi(wi/δ) = 0 < hi(wj) < limwi→∞ gi(wi) = ∞, by the
monotonicity of gi, ∃ a unique wi = bi(wj) ∈ (wi/δ,∞) such that gi(wi) S hi(wj) ⇔
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∂ψi/∂wi T 0 ⇔ wi S bi(wj). Therefore the unique best response of country i to any
wj ∈ [wj, w], is Bi(wj) = min{bi(wj), w}. As hi is increasing in wj, it follows that bi(wj)
is increasing and Bi(wj) is non-decreasing in wj. This completes the proof of (I)(i).
To prove (II)(i), first we show that G has a unique NE for ρ ∈ (−1, 0). Note from
the proof of (I)(i) that for i ∈ {a, b}, ∃ 0 < εi < w−wi such that Bi(wj) ∈ [wi + εi, w]
for any4 wj. Also observe that the constant term w
ixi in (3) does not play any role
in determining NE outcomes of G. Consider the two-person “transformed” game H in
which countries a, b choose wa, wb, where the strategy set of i is [w
i + εi, w] and its
payoff is
Φi(wa, wb) = log[(wi − w)x∗i (wa, wb)] = log(wi − wi) + log(x∗i (wa, wb)) (17)
The log function is well defined for the game H. Note that the set of NE of G coincides
with the set of NE of H.
Lemma A1 The log labour demand log(x∗i (wa, wb)) of any country i ∈ {a, b} has
increasing differences in (wa, wb), i.e., the following hold for w
′
a > wa, w
′
b > wb.
[log(x∗i (w
′
a, w
′
b))− log(x∗i (wa, w′b))]− [log(x∗i (w′a, wb))− log(x∗i (wa, wb))] > 0
Consequently the game H is a supermodular game.
Proof We prove the increasing difference result for i = a (the proof is similar for i = b).
Let tα(w) := α
1/(1+ρ)wρ/(1+ρ). Using (13) and simplifying, we have
[log(x∗a(w
′
a, w
′
b))− log(x∗a(wa, w′b))]− [log(x∗a(w′a, wb))− log(x∗a(wa, wb))]
= log
[tα(w
′
a) + t1−α(wb)][tα(wa) + t1−α(w
′
b)]
[tα(w′a) + t1−α(w
′
b)][(tα(wa) + t1−α(wb)]
> 0
Using the increasing difference result and the conclusions of Milgrom and Roberts
(1990) (see page 1271, the paragraph before equation (5)), it follows that the game H
is supermodular.
Lemma A2 For i ∈ {a, b}, let yi = log(wi). The payoff of i in the game H has the
following property: ∂2Φi/∂ya∂yb + ∂
2Φi/(∂ya)
2 < 0. Consequently H has a unique NE.
Proof We prove the inequality above for i = a (similar reasoning applies for i = b).
Denote α˜ ≡ [(1− α)/α]1/(1+ρ). Using (13) in (17) and simplifying:
Φa = log[exp(ya)− wa] + logK − ya + yb/(1 + ρ)− log[ν(ya, yb)]
where ν(ya, yb) := exp[yb/(1 + ρ)] + α˜ exp[ya/(1 + ρ)]. For i, j ∈ {a, b}, let νi =
∂ν/∂yi and νij = ∂
2ν/∂yi∂yj. Note that νab = 0 and ννaa − (νa)2 − νaνb = 0.
Hence ∂2 log[ν]/∂ya∂yb +∂
2 log[ν]/(∂ya)
2 = [ννaa − (νa)2 − νaνb]/ν2 = 0 implying that
∂2Φa/∂ya∂yb + ∂Φa/(∂ya)
2 = −wawa/(wa − wa)2 < 0.
Since H is a supermodular game, the inequalities above imply that H has a unique
NE (see equation (6), page 1271 of Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).
Since H has a unique NE, so does G. Having shown that G has a unique NE,
observe from part (I)(i) that for any country i, the unique best response Bi(wj) to any
4For example, take εi = (w
i + w)/2 in Case 1 and εi = δw in Case 2 of (I)(i).
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wj has either Bi(wj) = w > w
i, or Bi(wj) > w
i/δ > wi. So the unique NE of G does
not have wi = w
i for any i. This completes the proof of part (II)(i).
(III) This is immediate from the facts that for any wj, best response of i is increasing
in wi and that G possesses a unique NE.
Proof of Proposition 2 Note from the proof of Proposition 1 that if wi ≥ δw for
i ∈ {a, b}, then the unique NE is (wa = w,wb = w). To characterize NE for other cases,
let wi < δw for some i. Then the best response function of i is Bi(wj) = min{bi(wj), w}.
By the monotonicity of gi, we have bi(w) T w ⇔ gi(bi(w)) = hi(w) T gi(w). Using the
expressions of gi and hi from (16), we conclude that ∃ δ˜i ∈ (0, δ) (given by (5)) such
that
bi(w) T w ⇔ wi T δ˜iw (18)
(i) If wi < δ˜iw, then bi(w) < w and hence bi(wj) < w for all wj ∈ [wj, w]. So Bi(wj) =
bi(wj) for all wj ∈ [wj, w]. Therefore if wi < δ˜iw for i ∈ {a, b}, then there is no NE
where wi = w. Therefore, the unique NE has wi < w for both i.
(ii) Let wi < δ˜iw and w
j ≥ δw. Then Bj(wi) = w for all wi ∈ [wi, w]. So, the NE has
wj = w and wi = Bi(w). As w
i < δ˜iw, we have bi(w) < w and henceBi(w) = bi(w) < w.
So the unique NE has wi < w and wj = w.
(iii) By inequality (18) above, in this case we have bi(w) ≥ w for both i and hence
Bi(w) = w. So the unique NE has (wa = wb = w).
(iv) The proof is exactly similar to the three cases above.
The following lemma will be useful for the proof of Proposition 3.
Lemma A3 Let ρ ∈ (−1, 0) and δ ≡ −ρ ∈ (0, 1). Denote w/w ≡ θ > 1 and let
δ ∈ (1/θ, 1). Denote τ˜a ≡ α/(1− α), τ˜b ≡ (1− α)/α and for t > 0,
`t,δ(w) := t1/δ[(δw−w)/(1− δ)w](1−δ)/δw, rδ(w) := w/δ + (1− δ)2w2/δ(δw−w) (19)
(i) `t,δ(w) is increasing and rδ(w) is decreasing in w.
(ii) If G has an NE where wi < w for both i ∈ {a, b}, then `τ˜a,δ(wa) = rδ(wa) and
`τ˜b,δ(wb) = r
δ(wb).
(iii) Let m = min{τ˜a, τ˜b}. If rδ(w) > `m,δ(w), then G cannot have an NE where wi < w
for i ∈ {a, b}.
Proof Part (i) is immediate. For part (ii), let δ ∈ (1/θ, 1). If G has an NE where wi < w
for both i ∈ {a, b}, then from the proof of Proposition 1, we have ga(wa) = ha(wb) and
gb(wa) = hb(wa) where the functions gi, hi are given in (16). Taking w
a = wb = w, we
obtain wb = `
τ˜b,δ(wa) from the first and wa = `
τ˜a,δ(wb) from the second equation. Since
τ˜aτ˜b = 1, from these two equations we have (δwa − w)(δwb − w) = (1 − δ)2w2 which
implies that wb = r
δ(wa) and wa = r
δ(wb), proving (ii).
(iii) If rδ(w) > `m,δ(w), then there is at least one i ∈ {a, b} such that rδ(w) >
`τ˜i,δ(w). Then by (i), rδ(wi) > `
τ˜i,δ(wi) for all wi ∈ [w,w] and part (iii) follows by (ii).
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Proof of Proposition 3 Note from (5) that (a) if α < 1/2, then δ˜a < δ˜b < δ/(2− δ),
(b) if α > 1/2, then δ˜b < δ˜a < δ/(2− δ) and (c) if α = 1/2, then δ˜a = δ˜b = δ/(2− δ).
First we prove the second part of the proposition. Let wa = wb = w and δ ≤
2/(1 + θ). Then w ≥ δw/(2 − δ) and by the last paragraph, w ≥ δ˜iw for i ∈ {a, b}.
Applying Proposition 2(iii), the result follows.
Now consider θ > 2/(1 + θ). Note that 2/(1 + θ) > 1/θ (since θ > 1), so in this case
we can apply Lemma A3. Note that rδ(w) is decreasing in δ. Denoting δθ− 1 ≡ τ > 0,
we have
∂`m,δ(w)/∂δ = m1/δτ (1−δ)/δ[(θ − 1)δ + τ log((1− δ)/mτ)]/(1− δ)(1−δ)/δδ2τ (20)
Let δ̂ ≡ (m + 1)/(mθ + 1). Observe that if δ ≤ δ̂, then (1 − δ)/mτ ≥ 1 and by (20),
`m,δ(w) is increasing in δ. Next observe that rδ̂(w) = [1 + m(θ − 1)]w > w = `m,δ̂(w).
As `m,δ(w) is increasing and rδ(w) is decreasing in δ, it follows that rδ(w) > `m,δ(w)
for all δ ≤ δ̂. So by Lemma A3, for δ ∈ (2/(1+θ), δ̂], there is no NE of G where wi < w
for both i ∈ {a, b}, so the unique NE has race to the top property.
Proof of Lemma 2 (i) Using the budget constraint of the firm in (8) we have
φ12(w1, w2) = K − w(1− w1/w2)x∗1(w1, w2)−Kw/w2
Hence ∂φ12/∂w1 = −w(1− w1/w2)∂x∗1/∂w1 + wjx∗1/w2. Since ∂x∗1/∂w1 < 0, it follows
that ∂φ12/∂w1 > 0 if w1 ≤ w2. Similar reasoning shows ∂φ12/∂w2 > 0 if w2 ≤ w1.
(ii) Let w,w1, w2 ∈ (0, w]. By part (i), we have φj12(w,w) > φj12(w1, w) for w1 <
w and φj12(w,w) > φ
j
12(w,w2) for w2 < w. Consequently, a necessary condition for
φj12(w1, w2) to be maximized is that w1 = w2. When w1 = w2 = w, by (8), we have
φ12(w,w) = K−w(x∗1(w,w) +x∗2(w,w)). Denoting α/(1−α)1/(1+ρ) = t, in this case we
have x∗1(w,w) = K/w(1 + t), x
∗
2(w,w) = tK/w(1 + t), so that (x
∗
1(w,w) + x
∗
2(w,w)) =
K/w. This shows that φ12(w,w) is increasing in w and its unique maximizer for 0 <
w ≤ w is attained at w = w.
5.2 Subgames of Γ
In what follows we determine NE outcomes of subgames Γ(ta, tb) by classifying these
subgames into different classes. We assume ρ ∈ (−1, 0) and wa = wb = w. Denote
δ ≡ 1− ρ and θ ≡ w/w, so that δ ∈ (0, 1) and θ > 1. We also assume δ ≤ 1/(1 + θ).
5.2.1 Each country invested in only one input, each invested in different
inputs
Consider the game Γ(1, 2). This is the game in which country a has invested in input 1
and country b has invested in input 2 (the analysis is similar for the game Γ(2, 1)). In
the game Γ(1, 2), country a announces wage wa1 and country b announces wage w
b
1. Let
w1 = min{wa1 , w} and w2 = min{wb1, w}. The firm employs x∗i (w1, w2) units of input i.
For any input, the firm employs input from a country if the country offers a wage for
the input that does not exceed w; otherwise the firm employs from the external source.
Since δ ≤ 1/(1 + θ), by the last part of Proposition 3, we conclude the following.
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Observation 1 Γ(1, 2) has a unique NE: wa1 = w
b
2 = w. At the NE, country a obtains
φ1(w,w) and country b obtains φ2(w,w).
5.2.2 Each country invested in only one input, each invested in the same
input
Consider the game Γ(1, 1). This is the game in which both countries have invested in
the same input 1 (the analysis is similar for the game Γ(2, 2)). In the game Γ(1, 1),
country j ∈ {a, b} announces wage wj1. Let w1 = min{wa1 , wb1, w}. The firm employs
x∗i (w1, w) units of input i. The firm employs input 2 from the external source at wage
w. If min{wa1 , wb1} > w, the firm employs input 1 from the external source; otherwise
it employs input 1 from countries that offer the lowest wage for input i.
Observation 2 Γ(1, 1) has a unique NE: wa1 = w
b
1 = w. At the NE, each country
obtains zero payoff.
Proof Denote w1 = min{wa1 , wb1, w}. We prove the result in following steps.
Step 1: We cannot have an NE where w1 < w. To see this, consider a strategy
profile such that w1 < w. Then ∃ a country j ∈ {a, b} such that xj1 = λx∗1(w1, w) for
some λ ∈ (0, 1] and j obtains λφ1(w1, w) < 0. By unilaterally deviating to wj1 = w,
country j obtains zero payoff, so such a deviation is gainful.
Step 2: We cannot have an NE where w1 > w. To see this, consider a strategy
profile such that w1 > w. Then ∃ j ∈ {a, b} such that xj1 = λx∗1(w1, w) for some
λ ∈ [0, 1) and j obtains λφ1(w1, w). Let j unilaterally deviate to w1−ε where ε > 0 and
w1−ε > w. Following this deviation, j obtains φ1(w1−ε, w). Since w1 > w and λ < 1, we
have (1−λ)φ1(w1, w) > 0. Let 0 < δ < (1−λ)φ1(w1, w). Since φ1(w1, w) is continuous
in w1, for sufficiently small ε > 0 we have φ1(w1 − ε, w) > φ1(w1, w)− δ > λφ1(w1, w),
showing gainful deviation for j.
Step 3: By Steps 1-2, at any NE, we must have min{wa1 , wb1} = w. Now we show
that at any NE, we must also have max{wa1 , wb1} = w. Consider a strategy profile such
that min{wa1 , wb1} = w < max{wa1 , wb1}. Without loss of generality, let wa1 = w < wb1.
Since min{wa1 , wb1} = w, each country obtains zero payoff. Let country a unilaterally
deviate to w˜a1 such that w < w˜
a
1 < w
b
1. Following this deviation, a would obtain
φ1(w˜
a
1 , w) > 0, so the deviation is gainful. This shows that at any NE, we must have
wa1 = w
b
1 = w.
Step 4: Finally observe that the strategy profile (wa1 , w
b
1) where w
a
1 = w
b
1 = w is
indeed an NE. At this strategy profile, each country gets zero. There is no unilateral
deviation that gives positive payoff to a country.
5.2.3 One country invested in only one input, another country invested in
no input
Consider the game Γ(1, 0). This is the game in which country a invested in only input 1
and country b invested in no input (the analysis is similar for the games Γ(2, 0), Γ(0, 1)
and Γ(0, 2)). In the game Γ(1, 0), country b always obtains zero payoff. In this game
country a announces wage wa1 . Let w1 = min{wa1 , w}. The firm employs x∗i (w1, w) units
of input i. It employs input 2 from the external source at wage w. If wa1 = w1, the firm
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employs input 1 from country a; otherwise it employs input 1 from the external source
at wage w.
Observation 3 Γ(1, 0) has a unique NE. At the NE: wa1 = w, country a obtains
φ1(w,w) and country b obtains zero payoff.
Proof As country a obtains at most zero by setting wa1 ≤ w and zero payoff by setting
wa1 > w, at any NE we must have w
a
1 ∈ (w,w]. Since δ ≤ 2/(1+θ), by the last statement
of Proposition 3 it follows that the unique maximizer of φ1(w
a
1 , w) over w
a
1 ∈ (w,w] is
attained at wa1 = w. This proves the result.
5.2.4 One country invested in both inputs, another country invested in
only one input
Consider the game Γ(12, 1). In this game country a invested in both inputs 1, 2 and
country b invested in only input 1 (the analysis is similar for games Γ(12, 2), Γ(1, 12)
and Γ(2, 12)).
In the game Γ(12, 1), country a announces wage pair (wa1 , w
a
2) and country b an-
nounces wb1 (its wage for input 1). Let w1 = min{wa1 , wb1, w} and w2 = min{wa2 , w}. The
firm employs x∗i (w1, w2) units of input i. If min{wa1 , wb1} > w, the firm employs input
1 from the external source; otherwise it employs input 1 from countries that offers the
lowest wage for input 1. If wa2 > w, the firm employs input 1 from the external source;
otherwise it employs input 2 from country a.
Observation 4 Γ(12, 1) has multiple payoff-equivalent NE. Any NE has (wa1 , w
a
2) =
(w, w˜2) and w
b
1 = w, where w < w˜2 ≤ w. At any NE, country a obtains φ2(w, w˜2) and
country b obtains zero payoff.
Proof Denote w1 = min{wa1 , wb1, w}. We prove the result in the following steps.
Step 1: At any NE of Γ(12, 1), we must have wa2 ≤ w. To see this, consider (wa1 , wa2)
such that w2a > w. Then x
a
2 = 0 and x
a
1 ≤ x∗1(w1, w), so the payoff of country a is at
most φ1(w1, w). If w1 ≤ w, country a obtains at most zero. Let it unilaterally deviate
to (w,w); then xa2 would be positive and a would obtain positive payoff. If w1 > w,
let a deviate to (w1 − ε, w) such that ε > 0 and w1 − ε > w. Following this deviation,
country a would obtain
φ12(w1 − ε, w) = φ1(w1 − ε, w) + φ2(w1 − ε, w).
Note that φ2(w1, w) > 0. Let 0 < δ < φ2(w1, w)/2. Since for i = 1, 2, φi(w1, w) is
continuous in w1, for sufficiently small ε > 0, we have φi(w1 − ε, w) > φi(w1, w) − δ.
Hence
φ1(w1 − ε, w) + φ2(w1 − ε, w) > φ1(w1, w) + φ2(w1, w)− 2δ > φ1(w1, w)
showing that the deviation is gainful for country a.
Step 2: At any NE, we must have wa1 = w
b
1 = w. To see this, first note by Step
1, at any NE we have wa2 ≤ w. So w2 = wa2 and xa2 = x∗2(w1, wa2). In what follows, we
show that we cannot have w1 < w or w1 > w at any NE (recall w1 = min{wa1 , wb1, w}).
If w1 < w, then ∃ j ∈ {a, b} such that wj1 < w and xj1 = λx∗1(w1, w2) for some
λ ∈ (0, 1]. If j = b, then b obtains λφ1(w1, w2) < 0 (since w1 < w and λ > 0) and
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b is better off unilaterally deviating to w˜b1 = w to obtain zero payoff. If j = a, then
a obtains λφ1(w1, w2) + φ2(w1, w2) < φ2(w1, w2). By unilaterally deviating to (w,w2),
country a would obtain φ2(w1, w2), so the deviation is gainful.
If w1 > w, then ∃ j ∈ {a, b} such that wj1 > w and xj1 = λx∗1(w1, w2) for some
λ ∈ [0, 1). If j = b, then b obtains λφ1(w1, w2). Let b unilaterally deviate to w˜b1 = w1−ε
such that ε > 0 and w1− ε > w. Following this deviation, b obtains φ1(w1− ε, w2). As
w1 > w and λ < 1, we have (1−λ)φ1(w1, w2) > 0. Let 0 < δ < (1−λ)φ1(w1, w2). Since
φ1(w1, w2) is continuous in w1, for sufficiently small ε > 0, we have φ1(w1 − ε, w2) >
φ1(w1, w2)− δ > λφ1(w1, w2) showing that the deviation is gainful for b.
If j = a, then a obtains λφ1(w1, w2) + φ2(w1, w2). Let a unilaterally deviate to
(w1 − ε, w2) such that ε > 0 and w1 − ε > w. Following this deviation, a obtains
φ12(w1 − ε, w2) = φ1(w1 − ε, w2) + φ2(w1 − ε, w2).
As w1 > w and λ < 1, we have (1−λ)φ1(w1, w2) > 0. Let 0 < δ < (1−λ)φ1(w1, w2)/2.
Since for i = 1, 2, φi(w1, w2) is continuous in w1, for sufficiently small ε > 0 we have
φi(w1 − ε, w2) > φi(w1, w2)− δ. Hence
φ12(w1 − ε, w2) > φ1(w1, w2) + φ2(w1, w2)− 2δ > λφ1(w1, w2) + φ2(w1, w2)
showing that the deviation is gainful for a.
Thus, at any NE we must have w1 = min{wa1 , wb1, w} = w so that min{wa1 , wb1} = w.
If max{wa1 , wb1} > w, then ∃ j ∈ {a, b} such that wj1 = w and xj1 = x∗1(w,w2). If j = b,
then b obtains φ1(w,w2) = 0 and b is better off unilaterally deviating to w˜
b
1 such that
w < w˜b1 < min{wa1 , w} to obtain positive payoff. If j = a, then a obtains φ12(w,w2).
Let a unilaterally deviate to (w + ε, w2) such that ε > 0 and w + ε < min{wb1, w}.
Following this deviation, a obtains φ12(w+ ε, w2). Since w ≤ w2, by Lemma 2 we have
φ12(w + ε, w2) > φ12(w,w2). This shows the deviation is gainful for a. Therefore we
must have wa1 = w
b
1 = w at any NE.
Step 3: To complete the proof, consider a strategy profile ((wa1 , w
a
2), w
b
1) such that
wa1 = w
b
1 = w. Let w2 = min{wa2 , w}. At this strategy profile, choosing xa1 = λx∗1(w,w2),
xb1 = (1− λ)x∗1(w,w2) is optimal for the firm for any λ ∈ [0, 1]. Since φ1(w,w2) = 0, at
this strategy profile the payoff of country b is (1 − λ)φ1(w,w2) = 0 and the payoff of
country a is: (i) λφ1(w,w) = 0 if w
a
2 > w, (ii) λφ1(w,w
a
2) + φ2(w,w
a
2) = φ2(w,w
a
2) ≤ 0
if w2 ≤ w and (iii) λφ1(w,wa2) + φ2(w,wa2) = φ2(w,wa2) > 0 if w < wa2 ≤ w. By
Proposition 1(I)(i), φ2(w,w
a
2) has a unique maximizer w˜2 over w
a
2 ∈ [0, w]. Note that
w˜2 ∈ (w,w]. Thus at any NE, we must have wa1 = wb1 = w and wa2 = w˜2.
Finally we show that the profile ((w, w˜2), w) indeed constitutes an NE. To see this
first observe that at this strategy profile, for input 1 the firm is indifferent between the
two countries. For any λ ∈ [0, 1], choosing xa1 = λx∗1(w, w˜2) and xb1 = (1− λ)x∗1(w, w˜2)
is optimal for the firm. For any choice of λ by the firm, b obtains (1−λ)φ1(w, w˜2) = 0.
If b unilaterally deviates to wb1 6= w, it would obtain negative payoff if wb1 < w and zero
if wb1 > w, so no such deviation is gainful.
For any choice of λ by the firm, a obtains λφ1(w, w˜2) + φ2(w, w˜2) = φ2(w, w˜2) > 0.
Suppose a unilaterally deviates to (wa1 , w
a
2). If w
a
1 ≥ w, then a would obtain φ2(w,wa2),
which cannot exceed φ2(w, w˜2). If w
a
1 < w and either w
a
2 ≤ w or wa2 > w, then a would
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obtain at most zero. If wa1 < w < w
a
2 ≤ w, then a would obtain φ12(wa1 , wa2), which
is lower than φ12(w,w
a
2) (by Lemma 2). Since φ12(w,w
a
2) = φ1(w,w
a
2) + φ2(w,w
a
2) =
φ2(w,w
a
2) ≤ φ2(w, w˜2), this deviation is also not gainful for country a. This shows that
the strategy profile ((w, w˜a2), w) constitutes an NE.
This shows that the game Γ(12, 1) has multiple NE. Any NE has (wa1 , w
a
2) = (w, w˜2)
and w1b = w. Since both countries offer the same wage w for input 1, the firm is
indifferent between the two countries for this input. This results in multiple NE, but
all NE are payoff-equivalent.
5.2.5 One country invested in both inputs, another country invested in no
input
Consider the game Γ(12, 0). This is the game in which country a invested in both
inputs 1, 2 and country b invested in no input (the analysis is similar for the game
Γ(0, 12)). In the game Γ(12, 0), country b always obtains zero payoff. In this game
country a announces wage pair (wa1 , w
a
2). Let wi = min{wai , w} for i = 1, 2. The firm
employs x∗i (w1, w2) units of input i. If w
a
i = wi, the firm employs input i from country
a; otherwise it employs input i from the external source at wage w.
Observation 5 Γ(12, 0) has a unique NE: wa1 = w
b
1 = w. At the NE country a obtains
φ12(w,w) = (w − w)K/w > 0 and country b obtains zero payoff.
Proof First observe that at any NE of Γ(12, 0), we must have wai ≤ w for both i = 1, 2.
If wai > w for both i = 1, 2, then country a obtains zero payoff. By unilaterally
deviating to (w,wa2), it obtains payoff φ1(w,w
a
2) > 0, so the deviation is gainful. If
wai > w for only one i, without loss of generality let w
a
1 ≤ w < wa2 . Then country a
obtains φ1(w
a
1 , w). By unilaterally deviating to (w
a
1 , w), it would obtain φ12(w
a
1 , w) =
φ1(w
a
1 , w) + φ2(w
a
1 , w) > φ1(w
a
1 , w) so the deviation is gainful.
Next we show that at any NE we must have wa1 = w
a
2 . Consider (w
a
1 , w
a
2) such
that wai ≤ w for i = 1, 2. Then a obtains φ12(wa1 , wa2). If wa1 < wa2 ≤ w, then by
unilaterally deviating to (w˜a1 , w
a
2) such that w
a
1 < w˜
a
1 < w
a
2 , country a would obtain
φ12(w˜
a
1 , w
a
2) > φ12(w
a
1 , w
a
2) (by Lemma 2), so the deviation is gainful. By the same
reasoning there is a gainful unilateral deviation if wa2 < w
a
1 ≤ w.
Finally consider (wa1 , w
a
2) such that w
a
1 = w
a
2 = w ≤ w. By (8), a obtains φ12(w,w) =
K−w(x∗1(w,w)+x∗2(w,w)). Denoting α/(1−α)1/(1+ρ) = t, from (13) we have x∗1(w,w) =
K/w(1 + t), x∗2(w,w) = tK/w(1 + t), so that x
∗
1(w,w) + x
∗
2(w,w) = K/w. This shows
that φ12(w,w) is increasing in w and its unique maximizer for 0 < w ≤ w is attained
at w = w. This proves that this game has a unique NE: wa1 = w
b
1 = w. The payoffs are
immediate.
5.2.6 Both countries invested in both inputs
Consider the game Γ(12, 12) (the game in which both countries have invested in both
inputs 1, 2). In this game, country j ∈ {a, b} announces wage pair (wj1, wj2). Let
wi = min{wai , wbi , w} for i = 1, 2. The firm employs x∗i (w1, w2) units of input i. If
min{wai , wbi} > w, the firm employs input i from the external source; otherwise it
employs input i from countries that offer the lowest wage for input i.
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Observation 6 Γ(12, 12) has a unique NE: wai = w
b
i = w for both i = 1, 2. At the NE,
each country obtains zero payoff.
Proof For i = 1, 2, denote wi = min{wai , wbi , w}. We prove the result in following steps.
Step 1: We cannot have an NE where wi < w for some i = 1, 2. To see this,
take i = 1 (same reasoning applies for i = 2) and consider a strategy profile in which
w1 < w. Then ∃ a country j ∈ {a, b} such that xj1 = λx∗1(w1, w2) for some λ ∈ (0, 1]. If
w2 ≤ w, then country j obtains at most λφ1(w1, w2) < 0. By unilaterally deviating to
(w,w), country j would obtain zero payoff, so such a deviation is gainful.
Next suppose w2 > w. Then ∃ j ∈ {a, b} such that xj2 = λx∗2(w1, w2) for some
λ ∈ [0, 1). Let j = a (same reasoning applies if j = b). There are two possibilities: (i)
w1 = w
a
1 < w
b
1 and (ii) w1 = w
b
1 ≤ wa1 .
Let w1 = w
a
1 < w
b
1. Then a obtains φ1(w1, w2) + λφ2(w1, w2). Let a unilaterally
deviate to (w1, w2 − ε) where ε > 0 and w2 − ε > w. Following this deviation, a
would obtain φ1(w1, w2 − ε) + φ2(w1, w2 − ε). Since w2 > w and λ < 1, we have
(1− λ)φ2(w1, w2) > 0. Let 0 < δ < (1− λ)φ2(w1, w2)/2. Since φi(w1, w2) is continuous
in w2, for sufficiently small ε > 0 we have
φ1(w1, w2−ε)+φ2(w1, w2−ε) > φ1(w1, w2)+φ2(w1, w2)−2δ > φ1(w1, w2)+λφ2(w1, w2)
showing that the deviation is gainful for a.
Let w1 = w
b
1 ≤ wa1 . Since w1 < w, in this case a obtains at most λφ2(w1, w2). Let a
unilaterally deviate to (w,w2−ε) where ε > 0 and w2−ε > w. Following this deviation,
a would obtain φ2(w1, w2− ε). Since w2 > w and λ < 1, we have (1−λ)φ2(w1, w2) > 0.
Let 0 < δ < (1 − λ)φ2(w1, w2). Since φ2(w1, w2) is continuous in w2, for sufficiently
small ε > 0 we have φ2(w1, w2 − ε) > φ2(w1, w2) − δ > λφ2(w1, w2) showing that the
deviation is gainful for a.
Step 2: We cannot have an NE where wi > w for some i = 1, 2. To see this,
take i = 1 (same reasoning applies for i = 2) and consider a strategy profile in which
w1 > w. Then ∃ j ∈ {a, b} such that xj1 = λx∗1(w1, w2) for some λ ∈ [0, 1). Let j = a
(same reasoning applies for j = b). There are two possibilities: (i) w2 = w
a
2 ≤ wb2 and
(ii) w2 = w
b
2 < w
a
2 .
Let w2 = w
a
2 ≤ wb2. Since w2 ≥ w (by Step 1), in this case a obtains at most
λφ1(w1, w2) +φ2(w1, w2). Let a unilaterally deviate to (w1− ε, w2− ε) where ε > 0 and
w1−ε > w. Following this deviation, a would obtain φ1(w1−ε, w2−ε)+φ2(w1−ε, w2−ε).
Since w1 > w and λ < 1, we have (1−λ)φ1(w1, w2) > 0. Let 0 < δ < (1−λ)φ1(w1, w2)/2.
Since φ1(w1, w2) is continuous in w1, w2, for sufficiently small ε > 0 we have
φ1(w1 − ε, w2 − ε) + φ2(w1 − ε, w2 − ε)
> φ1(w1, w2) + φ2(w1, w2)− 2δ > λφ1(w1, w2) + φ2(w1, w2)
showing gainful deviation for a.
Let w2 = w
b
2 < w
a
2 . In this case a obtains λφ1(w1, w2). Let a unilaterally deviate
to (w1 − ε, wa2) where ε > 0 and w1 − ε > w. Following this deviation, a would
obtain φ1(w1 − ε, w2). Since w1 > w and λ < 1, we have (1 − λ)φ1(w1, w2) > 0. Let
0 < δ < (1 − λ)φ1(w1, w2). Since φ1(w1, w2) is continuous in w2, for sufficiently small
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ε > 0 we have φ1(w1− ε, w2) > φ1(w1, w2)− δ > λφ1(w1, w2) showing gainful deviation
for a.
Step 3: By Steps 1-2, at any NE, for both i = 1, 2, we must have min{wai , wbi} = w.
Now we show that at any NE, we must also have max{wai , wbi} = w for both i. Consider
a strategy profile such that min{wai , wbi} = w for both i = 1, 2 and there is some i (say
i = 1) for which min{wa1 , wb1} = w < max{wa1 , wb1}. Without loss of generality, let
wa1 = w < w
b
1. Since min{wai , wbi} = w for both inputs i = 1, 2, each country obtains
zero payoff. Let country a unilaterally deviate to (w˜a1 , w
a
2) such that w < w˜
a
1 < w
b
1.
Following this deviation, the firm would employ x∗1(w˜
a
1 , w) units of input 1 from country
a. So a would obtain φ1(w˜
a
1 , w) > 0, making the deviation gainful. This shows that at
any NE, for both i = 1, 2, we must have wai = w
b
i = w.
Finally observe that the strategy profile ((wa1 , w
a
2), (w
b
1, w
b
2)) such that w
a
i = w
b
i = w
for both i = 1, 2 is indeed an NE. This is because at this strategy profile each country
gets zero payoff and there is no unilateral deviation that gives positive payoff to a
country.
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